We study …rms' investment in internal control to reduce accounting manipulation. We …rst show the peer pressure for manipulation: one manager manipulates more if he suspects reports of peer …rms are more likely to be manipulated. As a result, one …rm's investment in internal control has a positive externality on peer …rms. It reduces its own manager's manipulation, which in turn mitigates the manipulation pressure on managers in peer …rms. Firms don't internalize this positive externality and thus under-invest in their internal control over …nancial reporting. The under-investment problem provides one justi…cation for regulatory intervention in …rms'internal control choices. JEL classi…cation: G18, M41, M48, K22,
Introduction
The wave of accounting frauds and restatements in early 2000 (e.g., Enron, WorldCom) have exposed the staggering failure of internal control over …nancial reporting in many …rms (GAO (2002) ). Until then a …rm's internal control decisions had long been deemed as its private domain and outside the purview of the securities regulations that had traditionally focused mainly on disclosure of those decisions (Ribstein (2002) , Coates (2007) ). However, the prevalence and magnitude of the internal control failures eroded the support for such practice and eventually led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in United States and similar legislatures in other countries. In addition to the enhanced disclosure requirements SOX has also mandated substantive measures to deter and detect accounting frauds 1 . Their mandatory nature has made these measures controversial (e.g., Romano (2005) , Hart (2009) ).
Even for those who felt that something had to be done with the …rms'internal control over …nancial reporting, it may not be clear why it should be done through regulations. Is there a case for regulation that intervenes in …rms' internal control decisions? Why don't …rms have right incentives to choose the optimal level of internal control to assure the veracity of their …nancial statements? In fact, Romano (2005) , in an in ‡uential critique of SOX, argues that "The central policy recommendation of this Article is that the corporate governance provisions of SOX should be stripped of their mandatory force and rendered optional for registrants."
We construct a model to study …rms'investment in internal control over …nancial reporting. In the model …rms can invest in costly internal control to detect and deter its manager's accounting manipulation. We show that such investment by one …rm has a positive externality on its peers. At the core of the channel for this externality is the peer pressure for accounting manipulation among …rms: one manager's incentive to manipulate is increasing in his expectation that reports from peer …rms are manipulated. As a result, a …rm's investment in internal control reduces its own manager's manipulation, which, in turn, mitigates the pressure for manipulation on managers in peer …rms. Since the …rm doesn't internalize this externality, it under-invests in the internal control over …nancial reporting. Regulatory interventions can improve the value of all …rms by mandating a ‡oor of internal control investment for all …rms.
In our model, there are two …rms with correlated fundamentals, indexed by A and B.
Each manager's payo¤ is a weighted average of the current stock price and the fundamental value of his own …rm. Investors rely on accounting reports to set stock prices. Accounting manipulation boosts accounting reports and allows the bad manager with successful manipulation to be pooled with the truly good ones. Investors rationally conjecture this pooling result and discount the pool accordingly to break even. In the equilibrium, the bad manager with successful manipulation receives an in ‡ated stock price at the expense of the truly good manager. Accounting manipulation is detrimental to …rm value and …rms do have private incentives to invest in their internal control over …nancial reporting.
In such a setting peer pressure for accounting manipulation arises. By peer pressure we mean that one manager manipulates more if he expects that the other …rm's report is more likely to be manipulated in equilibrium. In other words, the two managers' manipulation decisions are strategic complements in the sense of Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) . The mechanism works as follows. Consider manager A's manipulation decision.
Rational investors utilize reports from both …rms in setting the stock price of …rm A due to their correlated fundamentals. Investors compare report A with report B to distinguish between the truly good …rm A and the bad …rm with successful manipulation. Manipulation of report B reduces its informativeness and makes it less useful for investors of …rm A to cull out the bad one with successful manipulation. Anticipating that his fraudulent report is less likely to be confronted by report B, manager A expects a higher bene…t from manipulation and thus increases his manipulation. The manipulation of report B creates a "pressure" on manager A to manipulate because the opportunity cost for manager A not to manipulate is higher.
To further see this intuition, consider a special case in which two …rms'fundamentals are perfectly correlated and manager B doesn't manipulate. As a result, manager A will not manipulate either because any successful manipulation will be confronted by the report from manager B: If manager B is expected to manipulate a little bit, manager A now anticipates that his fraudulent report is sometimes camou ‡aged and thus has an incentive to manipulate.
The peer pressure for manipulation creates a positive externality of the …rm's costly investment in internal control. Firm B's investment in internal control reduces its own manager's manipulation. The reduction of manipulation in …rm B mitigates the pressure for manipulation on manager A, resulting in lower manipulation by manger A: However, …rm B doesn't internalize this externality and under-invests in the internal control from the perspective of maximizing the value of two …rms combined. This under-investment in internal control by individual …rms suggests a rationale for regulatory intervention that imposes some ‡oor of internal control over …nancial reporting.
The peer pressure for manipulation is often alleged in practice. One of the best known and most extreme example is the telecommunications industry around the turn of the new millennium (see Bagnoli and Watts (2010) Footnote 1 for detailed references to such allegations). When WorldCom turned to aggressive and eventually illegal reporting practices to boost its performance, peers …rms were under enormous pressure to perform. Horowitz (2003) claims: "Once WorldCom started committing accounting fraud to prop up their numbers, all of the other telecoms had to either (a) commit accounting fraud to keep pace with WorldCom's blistering growth rate, or (b) be viewed as losers with severe consequences."
Qwest and Global Crossing ended up with accounting frauds while AT&T and Sprint took a series of actions that aimed to shore up their short-term performance at the expense of long-term viability. While these companies had plenty of their own problems, the relentless capital market pressure undoubtedly made matters worse (see Sadka (2006) ).
The peer pressure mechanism also generates new empirical predictions. The central prediction is that peer …rms' manipulation decisions are correlated, even after controlling for their own fundamentals and characteristics. An exogenous increase in one …rm's manipulation incentive also elevates the manipulation incentives in peer …rms. For example, if one …rm's manager is given a stronger incentive pay, the model predicts that not only its own manager but also the managers from peer …rms are more likely to engage in manipulation.
For another example, one bank's loan loss provisioning is increasing in the peer average even after controlling for the bank and its peers'fundamentals. Some recent papers have examined how one …rm's fraudulent accounting a¤ects investment decisions in peer …rms (e.g., Gleason, Jenkins, and Johnson (2008) , Beatty, Liao, and Yu (2013) ). Our model suggests an additional e¤ect that one …rm's accounting manipulation and internal control imposes on its peer …rms.
Contributions and the literature review
We make two contributions. First, we provide a rational explanation of the peer pressure for manipulation arising from the capital market. Peer pressure for manipulation has been studied in other contexts. Both Bagnoli and Watts (2010) and Einhorn, Langberg, and Versano (2016) study the interactions of …rms' reporting choices and product market competition in a Cournot oligopoly setting. One result in Bagnoli and Watts (2010) (Result 5) shows numerically that two …rms'misreporting can be strategic complements when two …rms misreporting cost di¤erence is su¢ ciently large. Einhorn, Langberg, and Versano (2016) present an interesting "cross-…rm earnings management" mechanism: …rm A attempts to in ‡uence its investors' belief by changing its production decision that alters …rm B's manipulation that in turn a¤ects investors'use of report B in assessing …rm A: They show that such cross-…rm earnings management could serve as a commitment device for the oligopoly to reduce production and improve pro…tability.
The peer pressure for manipulation, in the form of collusion of actions, can also be induced by contractual payo¤ links among agents within the same …rm (e.g., Baldenius and Glover (2010) , Glover (2012) , Glover and Xue (2014) ). Carlin, Davies, and Iannaccone (2012) show that …rms' disclosure decisions interact with each other when there is an exogenous tournament structure of payo¤s to …rms. There are also behavioral explanations for the peer pressure for manipulation that one manager's unethical behavior diminishes the moral sanction for others to engage in the same behavior (e.g., Mittendorf (2006) , Mittendorf (2008) Fischer and Huddart (2008)). This explanation is often labeled as reporting culture, code of ethics, or social norms.
Our paper complements these explanations from a capital market pressure perspective that managers intervene in the reporting process to in ‡uence capital markets'inferences about their …rms. Capital market pressure is often viewed as a major motivation for accounting manipulation (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) ). We assume neither the contractual links among managers nor the complementarity of manipulation costs. Petacchi and Nagar (2014) study a model of "enforcement thinning" in which the manipulation decisions among …rms are also strategic complements. The regulator's budget of enforcement against frauds is …xed. As the number of …rms engaging in accounting manipulation increases, the probability that each …rm will be subject to the regulator's investigation becomes smaller and thus more …rms engage in manipulation.
Our second contribution is to provide one rationale for regulating …rms'internal control over …nancial reporting. As Leuz and Wysocki (2007) have pointed out, understanding the positive externalities of regulations are crucial for their justi…cation in the …rst place. Our model suggests that the proposal in Romano (2005) that the internal control mandates in SOX should be made optional is ‡awed. Competition among …rms (or state laws) doesn't lead to socially optimal investment in internal control.
This relates our paper to the literature on the externalities of disclosure and corporate governance. Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010) provide an excellent summary of various potential rationales for disclosure regulation. Dye (1990) , Admati and P ‡eiderer (2000) and Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) study how truthful disclosure by one …rm can a¤ect the decisions of investors of other …rms. Dye and Sridhar (1995) study a model of voluntary disclosure with veri…able messages in which …rms'information receipt is uncertain but correlated with each other. They show that one …rm's disclosure threshold depends on the number of peer …rms and the nature of the private information. Kartik, Lee, and Suen (2014) also study a voluntary disclosure model with veri…able messages in which two agents forecast the same fundamental. They show that the agents'disclosure strategies are strategic complements when concealing information is costly, but strategic substitutes when disclosing information is costly. They also examine a model of costly signaling similar to that in Kartik (2009) and show that the sender's incentive to misreport decreases as public information quality improves.
There have also been a series of recent papers that study the externality of managerial compensation and corporate governance in monitoring managerial consumption of private bene…t. The key channel is through the imperfection in the labor market for managers (e.g., Acharya and Volpin (2010) , Dicks (2012) , Thanassoulis (2012) ).
Our model is concerned with accounting manipulation because of our focus on the externality of internal control. Disclosure alone in our model doesn't solve the under-investment problem. In our model the …rms'internal control decisions are perfectly observed by investors and peer managers. Yet, the under-investment problem still arises.
The manipulation component of our model belongs to the class of signal jamming models (e.g., Stein (1989) ) with one important departure. Like in Stein (1989) , investors in our model have rational expectations and are not fooled by manipulation on average. Unlike in Stein (1989) , manipulation allows the bad managers with successful manipulation to be pooled with the truly good ones and receive an in ‡ated price. This allocational consequence of manipulation is a key element in generating the strategic complementarity between …rms' manipulation choices. We implement this departure by constraining the managers'message space, an approach adopted in Rajan (1994) , Chen, Hemmer, and Zhang (2007 ), Kartik (2009 ) and Strobl (2013 . Our model di¤ers from Rajan (1994) . In his model the two managers' manipulation decisions are correlated because their manipulation varies across the state. Conditional on the state, the …rst manager's manipulation is decreasing in his expectation of the second manager's manipulation. There are other modeling devices that break the fully separating equilibrium in Stein (1989) . For example, Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) and Heinle and Verrecchia (2014) introduce investors'uncertainty about the manager's objective functions. For another example, Dye and Sridhar (2004) and Beyer and Guttman (2012) rely on investors'uncertainty about the manager's cost of manipulation. Yet another example is Guttman, Kadan, and Kandel (2006) who adopt an equilibrium selection criterion that favors the manager. More broadly, the signal jamming model has been widely used to study economic consequences of earnings management. We refer readers to some recent surveys, including Leuz and Wysocki (2007) , Ronen and Yaari (2008) , Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010) , Ewert and Wagenhofer (2012) , and Stocken (2013) , due to the size of the literature (as partially evidenced by the number of surveys).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 solves the equilibria and examine the strategic relation among …rms' manipulation and internal control investment. Section 4 discusses some extensions and Section 5 concludes.
The model
The economy consists of two …rms, indexed by A and B: There are four dates, t = 0; 1; 2;
and 3: All parties are risk neutral and the risk free rate is normalized to 1:
Each …rm has a project that pays out gross cash ‡ow s i ; i 2 fA; Bg; at t = 3: s i is either high (s i = 1) or low (s i = 0). The prior probability that s i = 1 is i : The …rm's net cash ‡ow at t = 3, denoted as V i ; di¤ers from the gross cash ‡ow s i for two reasons explained below.
We refer to the net cash ‡ow V i as the …rm's long-term value and the gross cash ‡ow s i as the …rm's fundamental or type.
The payo¤ function of manager i is
The manager's interests are not fully aligned with the …rm's long-term value V i . Instead, the manager cares about both the long-term …rm value at t = 3 and the short-term stock price P i at t = 2: i 2 (0; 1) measures the manager's relative focus on the two.
Managers'concern for short-term stock price performance is empirically descriptive. For example, Stein (1988) argues that take-overs would force managers to tender their shares at the market prices even if they would like to hold the stocks for the longer term. For another example, Narayanan (1985) and Rajan (1994) contend that managers' reputation concern could lead them to focus on the short-term stock prices at the expense of the …rm's long-term value. Alternatively, managers'stock-based compensation or equity funding for new projects can also induce them to focus on their …rms'short-term stock price performance.
The stock price P i at t = 2 is in ‡uenced by both …rms'accounting reports. Each …rm's …nancial reporting process is as follows. At t = 1; each manager privately observes the fundamental s i : After observing his type s i ; each manager issues an accounting report r i 2 f0; 1g: The good manager always reports truthfully in equilibrium, i:e:; r i (s i = 1) = 1. The bad manager with s i = 0 may manipulate the report. The probability that the bad manger issues a good report, i:e:; r i (s i = 0) = 1; is
i is the probability that the bad …rm successfully issues a fraudulent report. This probability is determined jointly by the manager's manipulation decision m i and the …rm's internal control choice q i : m i 2 [0; 1] is the bad manager's e¤orts to overstate the report.
To economize on notations, we often use m i to denote the bad manager's manipulation m i (s i = 0) and omit the argument s i = 0 whenever no confusion arises. Manipulation e¤ort m i is the manager's choice at t = 1 after he has observed s i : m i reduces the …rm's long-term value by C i (m i ): C i (m i ) has the standard properties of a cost function (similar to the Inada conditions): C i (0) = 0; C 0 i (0) > 0; C 0 i (1) = 1 and C 00 i > c: c is a constant su¢ ciently large to guarantee that the manager's equilibrium manipulation choice is unique.
q i 2 [0; 1] denotes the quality of the …rm's internal control over …nancial reporting. It is interpreted as the probability that the manager's overstatement is detected and prevented by the internal control system. q i is the …rm's choice at t = 0 and reduces the …rm's cash ‡ow by K i (q i ): K i (q i ) has the standard properties of a cost function as well: K i (0) = 0;
K 0 i (0) > 0; K 0 i (1) = 1 and K 00 i > k: k is a constant su¢ ciently large to guarantee that the …rms'equilibrium internal control choice is unique. Unlike m i ; the …rm's choice of q i is publicly observable.
Overall, the bad manager can take actions to in ‡ate the report, but his attempt is checked by the internal control system. We model the cost of manipulation as a reduction in the …rm's long-term value. Both accrual manipulation and real earnings management are eventually costly to the …rm (e.g., Kedia and Philippon (2009) ). When the manager engages in accrual manipulation, the cost includes not only the direct cost of searching for opportunities, but also the indirect cost of the distraction of the manager's focus and the associated actions to cover up the manipulation. Real earnings management directly distorts the …rm's decisions and decreases the …rm's cash ‡ows. Our results are also robust to the alternative interpretation that C i or part of C i is the manager's private cost, such as the psychic su¤ering, the potential reputation loss, and the possible legal consequences (e.g., Karpo¤, Lee, and Martin (2008) ).
The …rm's net cash ‡ow (i:e:; the long-term …rm value) can now be written as
V i is lower than the gross cash ‡ow s i by two terms, the cost of manipulation C i and the cost of internal control K i :
Finally, the two …rms are symmetric, that is,
We keep the subscription i in the text to highlight the derivation of the equilibria. The only connection between the two …rms is that their gross cash ‡ows or types s i are correlated. 2 The correlation coe¢ cient can be either positive or negative. For example, if s i is related to customers'preferences for American cars, then the gross cash ‡ows for GM and Ford are positively correlated. However, if s i refers to a …rm's market share, then a higher s A for GM is likely to indicate a lower s B for Ford. For simplicity we assume away the trivial case of = 0: In addition, 2 [ ; 1] is bounded from below by maxf 1 ; 1 g; instead of 1: < 0 and approaches 1 when = 1 2 : This is because two Bernoulli variables are perfectly negatively correlated (i:e:; = 1) only if their marginal probabilities satisfy A = 1 B ; which holds for two symmetric …rms only if A = B = 1 2 : In sum, the timeline of the model is summarized as follows.
1. t = 0; …rm i publicly chooses its internal control quality q i ; 2. t = 1; manager i privately chooses manipulation m i after privately observing s i ; 3. t = 2; investors set stock price P i after observing both report r A and r B ; 4. t = 3; cash ‡ows are realized and paid out.
The equilibrium solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A PBE is characterized by the set of decisions and prices, fq 
The analysis
In this section we analyze the model in sequence. We …rst examine how one manager's manipulation decision is in ‡uenced by his expectation of the manipulation of his peer …rm's report and then study the design of internal control.
Equilibrium manipulation decisions

Equilibrium manipulation with only one …rm
To highlight the driving forces behind the peer pressure for manipulation, we start with a benchmark with only …rm A (or equivalently the two …rms'fundamentals are not correlated).
We solve the benchmark case of a single …rm by backward induction. Investors at t = 2 set the stock price P A (r A ) to be equal to their expectation of the …rm value V A upon observing report r A : Since they don't observe the manager's actual choice of manipulation m A , investors conjecture that the manager has chosen m A in equilibrium if his type is bad and 0 otherwise.
Recall that the probability that the bad type succeeds in manipulation is
Since q A is observable to investors at t = 2, investors thus conjecture A = m A (1 q A ):
Expecting this data generating process, investors use the Bayes rule to update their belief about the …rm type. De…ne A (r A ) Pr(s A = 1jr A ) as investors'posterior belief about the …rm being a good type conditional on report r A .
We …rst have A (0) = 0: Since the good …rm always issues the favorable report r A = 1 and only the bad …rm may issue the unfavorable report r A = 0, investors learn that the …rm issuing r A = 0 is a bad type for sure.
Upon observing the favorable report r A = 1; investors are uncertain about the …rm type.
The favorable report r A = 1 can be issued by either the truly good …rm (s A = 1) or the bad …rm with successful manipulation (s A = 0). The population of the former is A and of the latter is (1 A ) A : Using this knowledge, investors update their belief about the …rm type as follows:
Investors become more optimistic upon observing the favorable report r A = 1 because the probability of issuing the favorable report is higher for the good …rm than for the bad …rm, i:e:; 1 A : However, investors do discount the favorable report to re ‡ect the possibility that it is manipulated. If the bad …rm cannot manipulate (i; e:; A = 0), then A (1) = 1:
Investors take the favorable report at face value and don't discount it at all. If the bad …rm always succeeds in manipulation (i:e:; A = 1); then A (1) = A : Investors completely discard the favorable report. If the probability of manipulation is in between, A (1) 2 ( A ; 1).
The stock price P A (r A ) is then set to be equal to investors'expectation of the …rm value
The good …rm generates gross cash ‡ow of 1. The bad …rm generates gross cash ‡ow of 0 and incurs the manipulation cost of C A = C A (m A ): Both types pay the internal control cost
Investors pay a higher price for the favorable report, despite the manipulation. As a result the manager who cares about short-term stock price prefers report r A = 1 to r A = 0:
Anticipating the investors'pricing response to report P A (r A ), the bad manager chooses
Equation 4 describes the trade-o¤ of the manipulation decision. The …rst term is the marginal bene…t of manipulation. It increases the …rm's chance of issuing the favorable report
The second term is the marginal cost. Manipulation reduces the …rm's future cash ‡ow by C A (m A ): Since the manager has a stake of 1 A in the long-term …rm value, he bears part of the manipulation cost as well. The manager thus chooses the optimal manipulation level such that the marginal bene…t is equated to the marginal cost. We use H(m A ) de…ned in equation 4 to denote the di¤erence of the marginal bene…t and marginal cost for an arbitrary manipulation m A : Therefore,m A (m A ); de…ned by H(m A (m A )) = 0; characterizes the manager's best response to investors'conjecture m A : In equilibrium, the investors'conjecture is consistent with the manager's optimal choice, that is, m A (m A ) = m A : This rational expectations requirement implies that the optimal choice m A is de…ned by H(m A ) = 0: This manipulation game in general could have multiple equilibria, that is, the equation H(m A ) = 0 can have multiple solutions. Since the multiplicity is not our focus, we obtain the unique equilibrium by the assuming that both the manipulation cost function and later the internal control cost functions are su¢ ciently convex (see Cooper and John (1988) ). With the unique equilibrium determined, we conduct comparative statics to understand the determinants of the manager's optimal manipulation choice.
Lemma 1 When there is only …rm A; m A is increasing in A and A ; and decreasing in q A : a¤ect none of our formal results.
These properties of the equilibrium manipulation decisions are standard. First, m A is increasing in the investors'prior belief about the …rm type ( A ) before observing report r A :
When A is higher, investors expect that report r A = 1 is more likely to come from the good …rm and thus attach a higher valuation to it. The bad manager takes advantage of this optimism by manipulating more. Second, the manager manipulates more if he cares about the short-term stock price more.
Third, internal control reduces manipulation. All else being equal, an improvement in internal control quality detects manipulation more often and reduces the probability of fraudulent reports. This direct e¤ect deters the manager's manipulation. However, there is also an indirect e¤ect. Investors also anticipate the reduced manipulation in equilibrium and thus become more generous in their valuation of the favorable report, i:e:; @ @q A (P A (1) P A (0)) > 0: This entices the manager to manipulate more. Overall, the direct e¤ect dominates the indirect e¤ect for the following reason. An improvement in the internal control system a¤ects only the bad type (since the good type doesn't manipulate). From the perspective of investors who observe only r A = 1, the probability that the …rm is a bad type and thus a¤ected by the improvement is 1 A (1): Based on this belief they increase their valuation for r A = 1.
In contrast, the bad manager understands that the probability his report will be a¤ected is 1; higher than what investors expect. Therefore, from the bad manager's perspective, the improvement in internal control will reduce his probability of receiving the favorable report r A = 1 more than being compensated by investors'increased valuation for report r A = 1: As a result, he manipulates less in equilibrium.
Our single-…rm model is a variant of the signal jamming model (e.g., Stein (1989) ) with one important di¤erence. It has the de…ning feature that even though the manager attempts to in ‡uence investors' belief through unobservable and costly manipulation, investors with rational expectations are not systematically misled. On average they see through the manipulation and break even. The manipulation eventually hurts the …rm value through the distorted decisions.
Our model di¤ers from Stein (1989) in that information asymmetry between investors and the manager persists in equilibrium. The manager knows his type while investors observe only report r A = 1 that is a noisy signal of the manager's type s A . This information asymmetry is consequential for investors'pricing. Since investors condition the pricing decision only on report r A ; the same stock price P A (1) is paid to both the truly good …rm (s A = 1) and the bad …rm (s A = 0) with successful manipulation. Investors rationally anticipate this information asymmetry and price protect themselves by discounting both types of …rms.
However, the non-discriminatory discounting implies that the stock price P A (1) is too low from the perspective of the truly good manager but too high from the perspective of the bad manager with successful manipulation. Even though manipulation doesn't systematically mislead investors, it does reduce the report's informativeness to investors.
Equilibrium manipulation with two …rms
When there are two …rms with correlated fundamentals, investors can also use the peer …rm's report to improve their pricing decisions. We show that the informational spillover creates a peer pressure for manipulation: manager A's incentive to manipulate is increasing in his expectation that manager B has successfully manipulated report r B .
We rede…ne the notations to accommodate the addition of …rm The equilibrium stock price P A (r A ; r B ) is now set to be equal to investors'expectation of the …rm value V i conditional on r A and r B :
Like in the single-…rm case (eqn 3), the unfavorable report r A = 0 reveals s A = 0 perfectly.
As a result, the additional report r B doesn't a¤ect investors'belief, i:e:; A (0; ) = A (0; 1) = A (0; 0): Thus we focus on the favorable report r A = 1:
Conditional on r A = 1; report r B will also a¤ect investors'belief about s A and the e¤ect can go in either directions. Consider …rst the case of positive correlation > 0: If …rm B issues report r B = 1; it improves investors'belief that s B = 1: Because s B is positively correlated with s A ; investors also believe that s A = 1 is more likely. Hence, A (1; 1) A (1; ) > 0:
Report r B = 1 induces investors to discount r A = 1 less and enhances the credibility of r A = 1. In this sense, report r B = 1 provides camou ‡age for manager A's fraudulent report.
On the other hand, if …rm B issues an unfavorable report r B = 0; then investors revise their belief about both …rms' types and we have A (1; 0) A (1; ) < 0: Report r B = 0 reduces the credibility of report r A = 1: In this sense, report r B = 0 confronts the fraudulent report r A = 1: Thus, manager A prefers r B = 1 to r B = 0:
4 The claim is proved as follows. We can rewrite the conditional probability . Investors attach less credibility to r B = 1 as they suspect that it is more likely from a bad manager. We summarize these discussions in the next lemma.
Lemma 2 When there are two …rms, 
Equation 6 We discuss the intuition behind Proposition 1. To …x the idea, suppose the new manager to …rm B has a higher B . Both investors and manager A observe this change and conjecture that the equilibrium m B and B will be higher (according to Lemma 1). We need to explain why manager A responds to this expected increase in B by increasing his own manipulation.
We can write out the bad manager's expected payo¤ or his expectation of the investors' belief about his …rm's type as
We start with a benchmark in which the investors are assumed to be naive. They don't anticipate the change in the distribution of report r B induced by an expected increase in B : In other words, we impose @[ A (1;1) A (1;0)] @ B = 0: Equation 7 then suggests that the e¤ect of B on manager A's expectation is determined solely by its e¤ect on Pr(r B = 1js A = 0):
Again we consider the case of > 0 …rst. Manager A expects that an increase in B will increase the frequency of favorable report r B = 1: Since report r B = 1 provides camou ‡age for manager A's manipulation (part 1 of Lemma 2), manager A now is tempted to manipulate more. Consider the other case of < 0: Manager A still expects that r B = 1 becomes more often as B increases. However, report r B = 1 now contradicts …rm A's fraudulent report (part 2 of Lemma 2). As a result, manager A manipulates less.
In sum, when investors are naive, the manager's response to his peer …rm' manipulation depends on the sign of the correlation. As he expects an increase in the manipulation likelihood of his peer …rm's report, he manipulates more when two …rms'fundamentals are positively correlated but less when they are negatively correlated.
Investors, however, are rational in our model. They understand the in ‡ation of the distribution of report r B induced by an increase in B and discount report r B = 1 accordingly.
The next lemma summarizes how investors'rationality works in our context.
Lemma 3 is an immediate consequence of the investors'rationality or the law of iterated expectations. It merely states that the arrival of report r B will not a¤ect investors' belief on average. Since the average belief is not in ‡uenced by the presence of report r B ; it is independent of B that in ‡uences the distribution of r B : Combining Lemma 3 with Lemma 2 that describes how B a¤ects investors'belief ex post (after observing r B ), we can describe how rational investors respond to an expected increase in B : 5
Equation 8 rationally anticipating the in ‡ation, investors discount report r B = 1 accordingly. That is,
A (1; 1)
A (1; 0); the belief di¤erence investors attach to report r B = 1 relative to r B = 0;
moves towards 0 as B increases, as can be seen from Lemma 2. We term this e¤ect the discounting e¤ect of B . Lemma 3 claims that the probability and the discounting e¤ects have to cancel out each other perfectly so that B doesn't a¤ect the investors'belief about s A averaged over r B : Hence equation 8.
We can rewrite the bad manager's expected payo¤ (equation 7) by plugging in equation
8: Consider the case of > 0 …rst. From the perspective of the bad manager A; investors under-estimate the probability that manager B is a bad type. As a result, they also underestimate the probability e¤ect (i.e., the impact of B on the frequency of r B = 1) and don't discount r B = 1 su¢ ciently when they use report r B = 1 to evaluate r A = 1. Since report r B = 1 provides camou ‡age for manager A's manipulation (part 1 of Lemma 2), investors' insu¢ cient discounting of r B = 1 increases manager A's payo¤ from delivering r A = 1 and thus induces manager A to manipulate more. Now consider the case of < 0: With < 0; the bad manager knows that …rm B is less likely to be a bad type than investors believe, i:e:; Pr(s B = 0js A = 0) < Pr(s B = 0jr A = 1)
for < 0: From the bad manager's perspective investors over-estimate the probability that manager B is a bad type. As a result, they also over-estimate the probability e¤ect and discount r B = 1 excessively. Since report r B = 1 confronts the fraudulent report r A = 1 (part 2 of Lemma 2), investors' excessive discounting of report r B = 1 reduces the threat that manager A's fraudulent report is confronted. As a result, he manipulates more.
Overall, regardless of the sign of ; manager A manipulates more when he suspects that manager B is more likely to manipulate successfully. This peer pressure for manipulation is driven by two intertwined forces. First, manipulation by manager A leads to information asymmetry about …rm A's fundamental in equilibrium between manager A and investors, as we have discussed in the single-…rm case. This information asymmetry enables the bad manager with successful manipulation to be pooled with the truly good ones and bene…t from manipulation. Second, the information asymmetry also enables manager A to forecast the impact of B better than investors. Proposition 1 emphasizes that, conditional on the availability of report r B ; an increase in the manipulation of report r B exacerbates the information asymmetry and bene…ts the fraudulent manager A: In other words, more manipulation of report B makes it easier for the fraudulent report from …rm A to be camou ‡aged by r B = 1 (when > 0) and harder to be confronted by r B = 1 (when < 0). As a result, the bad manager A increases his manipulation.
An extreme case can illustrate the intuition further. Consider a special case = 1 so that s A and s B are perfectly correlated. Suppose we start with m B = 0 and thus B = 0: Since manager B never manipulates, investors don't discount report r B = 1. However, the bad manager A will not manipulate either because he fears that there will be no camou ‡age for his fraudulent report from report r B = 1. The perfect correlation between s A and s B means that he privately knows that s B = 0 for sure and thus r B = 1 with probability 0: Now suppose m B increases by a small amount " so that B > 0: The bad manager now will engage in a positive amount of manipulation. He anticipates that investors will discount r B = 1 a little bit by narrowing the price di¤erence A (1; 1) A (1; 0) slightly. However, he also expects that there is a positive probability of receiving r B = 1; resulting in a positive expected payo¤ of manipulation. Thus, as B moves away from 0; manager A starts to manipulate as well. Kartik, Lee, and Suen (2014) have proven a general statistical result that, loosely speaking, a more informative experiment will on average bring the posteriors of two agents with di¤erent priors closer to their respective priors. They call it information-validates-the-prior (IVP) theorem. The IVP theorem provides another way to see the intuition of Proposition 1.
As we have discussed at the end of the previous section, information asymmetry occurs in equilibrium between manager A and the investors in our model. After we solve for the unique equilibrium, the optimal manipulation decisions (m A ; m B ) can be expressed as functions of the …rms'choices of internal control (q A ; q B ) and we can examine the equilibrium e¤ect of internal control on manipulation.
Proposition 2
Proposition 2 con…rms that a …rm's internal control has an externality on its peer …rm.
An improvement in one …rm's internal control quality reduces not only its own manager's manipulation (i:e: @m A (q A ;q B ) @q A < 0) but also the peer manager's manipulation (i:e:
via the mitigation of the peer pressure for manipulation. Lemma 1 shows that a …rm's internal control directly deters its own manager's manipulation and reduces A (the probability that report A is manipulated). Proposition 1 suggests that, through symmetry between …rm 
Equilibrium internal control decisions
In the previous section, we characterized the managers' manipulation decisions at t = 1, taking the …rms' internal control choices q A and q B at t = 0 as given. In this section we endogenize the …rms' internal control decisions. We show that even though …rms do have private incentive to invest in internal control, they under-invest in internal control due to the externality described in Proposition 2.
After understanding managers'manipulation decisions, we fold back to t = 0 and consider …rm A's private incentive to invest in costly internal control over …nancial reporting. Since …rm A doesn't observe …rm B's choice of internal control at the time of choosing q A ; it conjectures that …rm B will choose q B in equilibrium. Moreover, …rm A anticipates that managers at t = 1 respond to its actual choice of q A through m A (q A ; q B ) and m B (q B ; q A ).
Based on these expectations, the …rm value at t = 0 as a function of its internal control choice
The …rm value at t = 0 has three components. The …rst is the expected gross cash ‡ow E v A [s A ] = in absence of manipulation and internal control investment. Second, manipulation generates the expected deadweight loss Pr(s A = 0)C A (m A (q A ; q B )): The existence of this deadweight loss means that the …rm has private incentive to invest in internal control to prevent manipulation. Finally, the internal control investment itself consumes resources and reduces the …rm value by K A (q A ).
Firm A at t = 0 chooses q A to maximizes V A0 (q A ; q B ) subject to the managers'subsequent
in equation 12 with respect to q A ; the …rst-order condition is
The …rst term @V A0 @m A @m A @q A captures the bene…t of internal control q A in reducing manipulation. It is balanced by the marginal cost K 0 (q A ). Note thatq A (q B ) implied by the …rst order condition is …rm A's best response to its conjecture of …rm B's equilibrium internal control choice q B : We can solve …rm B's internal control decision using the same procedure.
Taking q A as given, …rm B's best response to q A ,q B (q A ); is characterized by a similar …rst order condition. Intercepting the two best responses q A =q A (q B ) and q B =q B (q A ), we prove that there exists a unique equilibrium when the cost function of internal control investment is su¢ ciently convex. This complete the characterization of the entire equilibrium. After we have solved for the entire equilibrium, we can compare the private and social incentives for internal control investment. So far in the model, each …rm chooses its internal control investment independently to maximize its own …rm value. Now consider a hypothetical case in which a social planner chooses the internal control decisions for both …rms to maximize the value of the two …rms combined. Denote the social planner's choices as
To avoid the distributional issue between the two …rms, we use the assumption that the two …rms are symmetric and denote q = q A = q B and q SP = q SP A = q SP B .
Proposition 4 Firms under-invest in their internal control relative to the social planner's choice, i:e:; q < q SP :
To see the under-investment problem, consider the social planner's internal control decision of q A ; given her choice q SP B for …rm B: Anticipating the equilibrium manipulation
and m B q SP B ; q A , the social planner chooses q A to maximize the value of both
; q A and the …rst-order condition becomes
The …rst term @V A0 @m A @m A @q A is the bene…t of internal control for …rm A. The second term @V B0 @m B @m B @q A captures the positive externality …rm A's internal control exerts on …rm B. Proposition 2 suggests that @m B @q A < 0: The reduction in m B improves the …rm value of …rm B: Since …rm A ignores this bene…t when choosing q A ; q A is lower than the level the social planner chooses.
Proposition 4 suggests that there could be a coordination failure among …rms'individual choices of internal control over …nancial reporting. It provides one rationale for intervention in …rms'internal control investment. In the presence of peer pressure for manipulation, one …rm's internal control investment has positive externality on other …rms. A ‡oor of internal control investment could improve the …rm value of all …rms. Looking through the lens of Proposition 4, the proposal in Romano (2005) that the internal control mandates in SOX should be made optional is ‡awed. Competition among …rms (or state laws) doesn't lead to socially optimal investment in internal control.
We have highlighted one potential bene…t of regulating internal control over …nancial reporting. However, regulations come with their own costs. Since Stigler (1971) , we know that regulators'incentives may be aligned with the regulated …rms and organized vested interest groups more than with the social welfare. Moreover, even well-intended regulators may not be able to achieve the full potential of regulations due to the information disadvantage in designing and implementing regulations. Thus, while our model provides one possible bene…t of regulations like SOX, a comprehensive evaluation of SOX is a complicated enterprise and beyond the scope of our paper. We refer the readers to the recent surveys like Leuz and Wysocki (2007) and Coates and Srinivasan (2014) .
Extensions
The core of our model is the peer pressure for manipulation. A manager manipulates more when he expects that the reports from his peer managers are more likely to be manipulated. This peer pressure for manipulation leads to the externality of internal control investment over …nancial reporting and ultimately the under-investment in internal control investment.
We have made a number of simplifying assumptions in the baseline model in order to highlight the economic forces behind the peer pressure for manipulation. In this section, we discuss two extensions to the baseline model.
N Firms
We have focused on a two-…rm economy in the baseline model. It is straightforward to extend the model to N > 2 …rms. Suppose the pair-wise correlation coe¢ cient between any two …rms i and j is ij 6 = 0. Consider manager i's manipulation decision m i as a best response to j m j (1 q j ): j is manager i's conjectured probability that a bad …rm j has successfully manipulated its report. The following results can be obtained using a similar proof of Proposition 1.
Proposition 5 m i ( j ) is increasing in j for any j 6 = i; regardless of the sign of ij :
A manager manipulates more if he suspects that any of his peer …rms'reports is more likely to be manipulated. We omit the proof of this Proposition because it is an immediate result of the conditional independence property of the reports and Proposition 1. Conditional on the fundamental s i , report r i and r j are independent of each other. As a result, the presence of any additional …rms k 2 N nfi; jg doesn't a¤ect the interaction between …rm i and j: In other words, investors can …rst use all …rms'reports r k ; other than r i and r j ; to update their belief about s i . Treating this posterior as a prior, investors continue to use report r i and r j ;
like in our baseline model of two …rms. 6 The peer pressure holds for any pair of …rms within in the N …rms as long as their fundamentals are correlated.
Imperfect information
Another simpli…cation in the baseline model is that we assume that the managers know their …rms'fundamentals perfectly. If at the time managers receive only noisy private information about their …rms' fundamentals there would be measurement errors in the reports in the absence of manipulation. Manipulation then may help correct the measurement errors. Now we assume that the fundamental or the gross cash ‡ow is v i 2 f0; 1g: Each manager receives a noisy signal s i 2 f0; 1g about v i : Pr(s i = 1jv i = 1) = Pr(s i = 0jv i = 0) = 2 [ 1 2 ; 1]: measures the quality of managers' signals and our baseline model is a special case of = 1: With this speci…cation, we can replicate Proposition 1 that manager A with s i = 0 manipulates more if he expects that report B is more likely to be manipulated. The proof goes through essentially by rede…ning the fundamental s i : Even though managers receive noisy signals about the fundamentals, they still know more than the investors and thus the information asymmetry persists in equilibrium.
Discussions and the conclusion
We have presented a model to show that a …rm's investment in internal control has a positive externality on peer …rms. The core of the mechanism is the strategic complementarity of manipulation. A manager manipulates more if he expects that the reports from peer …rms are more likely to be manipulated. As a result, a …rm's investment in internal control bene…ts not only itself by reducing its own manager's manipulation but also the peer …rms by mitigating the manipulation pressure on peer managers. Without internalizing this positive externality, …rms under-invest in internal control over …nancial reporting. Regulations that provide a ‡oor of internal control investment can mitigate the under-investment problem. 6 See footnote 4 for the discussion of the implications of the conditional independence properties.
We have presented a stylized model to deliver the intuition for the strategic complementarity of manipulation and the externality of a …rm's internal control. In particular, the binary structure has dramatically simpli…ed the exposition. However, we believe that the economic forces behind the peer pressure for manipulation are more general. The strategic complementarity between the two managers' manipulation decisions is driven by two features of the model. First, manager A can forecast manager B's manipulation better than the investors. Second, manipulation reduces the report's informativeness. The …rst feature arises naturally in a setting when the managers have private information about their own fundamentals that are correlated with each other. Thus, as long as the second feature is preserved in a richer model in which manipulation leads to information degradation, the strategic complementarity between two managers'decisions is expected to be intact.
We have focused on the capital market pressure as the driver for accounting manipulation, which appears empirically important (e.g., Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) ). As a result, we have assumed that the two …rms are independent except for the correlation of their fundamentals. In practice, peer …rms are likely to interact with each other in other areas (such as product markets, labor markets, performance benchmarking, and regulation) and those interactions may also lead to interactions of their accounting decisions. As we have discussed in the literature review, these other interactions are promising venue for future research.
Appendix
Proof. of Lemma 1: For notational ease, we use C A = C A (m A ) whenever no confusion arises. For a given q A 2 (0; 1); after we impose the rational expectations requirement, m A is determined by the …rst-order condition:
We …rst verify that the equilibrium is unique, i:e:; H(m A ) = 0 has a unique solution. First, under our assumption that C A is su¢ ciently convex, we have
The sign of
Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem, the equilibrium m A that satis…es H(m A ) = 0 is unique.
For any parameter x 2 f A ; A ; q A g, the application of the implicit function theorem generates
The denominator @H(m A ) @m A < 0. As a result, the sign of @m A @x is the same as that of
Notice that for the last result @H(m A ;q A ) @q A < 0; there are two components. The …rst compo- 
The last step holds because B 2 (0; 1) and thus 
The proof for the properties of A (1; 1) A (1; 0) is similar and hence omitted. Therefore, we have proved Lemma 2.
Proof. of Proposition 1 and Lemma 3: The proof of Lemma 3 is straightforward.
The …rst step is by the reverse use of the law of iterated expectation and the second step is by de…nition. From equation 2, we know that A (1) is independent of B : Therefore, E r B [ A (1; r B ) ] is independent of B :
Now we prove Proposition 1. For given interior q A and B and investors'conjecture m A ; manager A's best responsem A ( B ) is determined by the …rst-order condition:
The application of the implicit function theorem generates
The denominator @H A @m A is negative following a similar proof in Lemma 1. Thus, the sign
is the same as that of
has the same sign as
:
We now prove that
> 0: In words, the bad manager becomes more optimistic about investors'belief as B increases.
We …rst write out the investors'belief about s A = 1 before they observe r B but after they observe r A = 1 :
Pr (s A = 1jr A = 1) = Pr(r B = 0jr A = 1) A (1; 0) + Pr(r B = 1jr A = 1) A (1; 1) = A (1; 0) + Pr(r B = 1jr A = 1) ( A (1; 1) A (1; 0)) :
The second step writes out the expectation and the third regroups the terms. This gives us equation 8 in the text which we reproduce here:
We can similarly write out the bad manager's expectation about the investors'expectation of s A = 1 as
= Pr(r B = 0js A = 0) A (1; 0) + Pr(r B = 1js A = 0) A (1; 1)
Again the …rst step writes out the expectation and the second regroups the terms. The third step plugs in equation 15. The last step writes out the total probability of Pr(r B = 1jr A = 1) and reorganize the terms. Note that B only a¤ects the likelihood ratio Pr(r B =1js A =1) Pr(r B =1js A =0) in the last equality. Thus, we have
The second step relies on expression 14, the result from the proof in Lemma 1. Therefore, regardless of ; E r B [ A (1; r B )js A = 0] is increasing in B : Lastly, since B = m B (1 q B ) is increasing in m B and decreasing in q B ,m A ( B ) is increasing in m B and decreasing in q B .
Proof. of Proposition 2: We …rst prove that the equilibrium (m A (q A ; q B ) ; m B (q B ; q A )) is unique in two steps. First, we solve for manager A's unique best responsem A (m B ): This part is similar to the proof in Lemma 1 because manager A's best response problem (after imposing the investors'rational expectations) is essentially a single …rm problem with given m B and q B :
Second, we plug manager A's best response into manager B's …rst order condition and show that manager B's optimization has a unique solution as well. By substituting the best responsem A (m B ) into H B (m B ; m A ) = 0 and obtain H B (m B ;m A (m B )) = 0:
We show that this equation has a unique solution when the cost functions are su¢ ciently convex. Atm B = 0, H B (0;m A (0)) = B (1 q B ) (1 + C B (0)) > 0: Atm B = 1, H B (1;m A (1)) =
In addition, we verify that H B (m B ;m A (m B )) is strictly decreasing inm B .
where the second step is from @m A (m B ) which can be simpli…ed into
Solving the two equations gives
We have shown that in the unique equilibrium, the denominator is positive. Hence the signs of 
Proof. of Proposition 3: The proof of the uniqueness of the internal control equilibrium is similar to that of the manipulation choice in Proposition 2. In short, when K A (q A ) is su¢ ciently convex, the LHS of the …rst-order condition of q A , @V A0 @m A @m A @q A K 0 (q A ), is decreasing in q A , making the best responseq A (q B ) unique. Substitutingq A (q B ) into manager B's best response gives @V B0 @m B @m B @q B j q A =q A (q B ) K 0 B (q B ) = 0:
When K B (q B ) is su¢ ciently convex, the LHS @V B0 @m B @m B @q B j q A =q A (q B ) K 0 B (q B ) is decreasing inq B , making the solution of q B =q B (q B ) unique. As a result, the equilibrium decisions q A =q A (q B ); m A (q A ; q B ), and m B (q B ; q A ) are also unique.
Proof. of Proposition 4: From the main text, given …rm B's individual internal control choice q B , an individual …rm A's internal control choice q A is determined by @V A0 (q A ; q B ) @m A @m A (q A ; q B ) @q A K 0 A (q A ) = 0:
Since the two …rms are symmetric, we have q A = q B = q and @V A0 (q ; q ) @m A @m A (q ; q ) @q A K 0 A (q ) = 0:
Given her choice q SP B , the social planner's internal control decision q SP A is given by
Similarly, since the two …rms are symmetric, the social planner's choices of internal control for the two …rms are also symmetric, i.e., q SP A = q SP B = q SP , we have @V A0 q SP ; q SP @m A @m A q SP ; q SP @q A + @V B0 q SP ; q SP @m B @m B q SP ; q SP @q A K 0 A (q SP ) = 0:
Notice that for k su¢ ciently large, the social planner's objective function is strictly concave in q SP and the …rst-order condition is strictly decreasing in q SP . To compare q and q SP , we de…ne f (q) = @V A0 (q; q) @m A @m A (q; q) @q A + @V B0 (q; q) @m B @m B (q; q) @q A K 0 A (q):
f (q) is the social planner's …rst order condition and thus we have f (q SP ) = 0: Moreover, we have
The second equality is due to the …rst order condition for q : @V A0 (q ;q ) @m A @m A (q ;q ) @q A K 0 A (q ) = 0. Since @V B0 (q ;q ) @m B < 0 and @m B (q ;q ) @q A < 0, we have f (q ) > 0: That is, evaluated at q = q , the …rst-order condition for the social planner is positive. Since the social planner's …rst-order condition is strictly decreasing in q, we have q < q SP . Firms under-invest in their internal control relative to the socially optimal level.
